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Abstract 
 
Background: Recent continental-phenomenological psychiatry emphasizes pragmatics or social and contextual inappropriateness 
as a core disorder of schizophrenia, which is potentially relevant to early identification and treatment. 
Objective: However, there are hardly any studies that examine the background population’s sensitivity to inappropriateness in 
schizophrenia, even if “common” people, from a pragmatic perspective, are likely to be highly sensitive to cultural-
conventional norms, including (in)appropriateness. 
Method: One empirical evaluation of contextual (in)appropriateness in 10 narratives from first-episode schizophrenia patients 
and healthy controls, respectively, found that when a phenomenologically informed Danish population (n=157 high-school 
students; mean age, 18.5) was “blinded” to the control–patient status – that is, “anonymous” narratives of the wordless picture 
story Frog, Where Are You? – they consequently evaluated patient narratives as more inappropriate than appropriate and control 
narratives as more appropriate than inappropriate (significant with 0.007). Aiming to explore a potential pattern recognition, 
distinguishing patient from control narratives, the present study systematizes and discusses salient explanations from lay 
“experts” who almost consequently (80% to 100%) evaluated patient narratives as inappropriate and control narratives as 
appropriate (n=63 of 157). 
Results: Explanations of inappropriateness concerned affective aspects (about how the patient felt or how the evaluators felt 
reading the narrative), formal aspects (about pauses, fluency, and brevity), and aspects about sense making (from lack of 
understanding to nonsense and strangeness).The background population may be sensitive to affective and formal 
inappropriateness, but only lay experts emphasize the lack of sense in the patients’ narratives. 
Conclusion: Further studies might benefit from investigating whether early referrals from family, friends, or schoolteachers 
of their own accord thematize such inappropriateness aspects, and whether questionnaires targeting inappropriateness could 
be developed and used in the early identification of young people at risk. 
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Introduction 
The question “what is schizophrenia?” remains 
largely unanswered. This “whatness”, the 
diagnostically defining and symptom-producing 
vulnerability trait or “core” of schizophrenia, is in 
recent continental-phenomenological psychiatry 
regarded as based not on cognitive deficits but on 
cognition used at the expense of pragmatics (1-4). 
“Pragmatics” is primarily understood in the sense of 
what is contextually or socially appropriate. An 
example to illustrate this basic lack of balance 
between cognition and pragmatics is the schizoid 
father who buys a coffin as a Christmas present for 
his dying daughter – a logically correct cognition, as 
she will eventually need it, but somehow manifesting 
a “friction” within our socio-cultural context (4). 
Social and contextual inappropriateness manifests 
most salient in the “interpersonal and 
communicative-symbolic space” (3, p. 68). 
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However, there are very few studies that examine 
the background population’s sensitivity to 
inappropriateness in first-episode schizophrenia, 
even if “common” people, from a pragmatic 
perspective, are likely to qualify as good “guessers” 
of appropriate cultural-conventional norms of social 
conduct (5), and even if distinctive and typical 
vulnerability traits often antedate the manifest illness 
(6), and consequently may be of crucial importance 
to early identification and treatment, well before the 
more flamboyant symptoms of hallucinations and 
delusions manifest and fulfill the diagnostic criteria 
stipulated at a very high severity level (4). 
From a practical and pragmatic perspective, 
significant, loyal, and cultural-conventional “others” 
such as family, friends, and schoolteachers may sense 
discrete social or contextual inappropriateness 
several years before first admission. 
One example is a colleague of mine who received 
an email from an acquaintance, who was in love with 
her, with a portentous p.s. saying “take care of your 
children”. She found this “warning” inappropriate 
probably because any utterance carries a claim of its 
own relevance and consequently allows various 
inferred meanings on the part of the hearer (7-8). In 
this case, for example “do I not take care of my 
children?” or “what happens if I am not especially 
careful?” The sender was later hospitalized and 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. 
Disambiguated in this diagnostic context, the p.s. 
may constitute a literal warning, albeit very direct and 
transgressive (basically, taking charge of her private 
life). The sharing of information may even reflect a 
sincere concern for my colleague, whom he was, after 
all, in love with. He was rejected as a romantic 
partner, and in the cleverness of hindsight, we may 
wonder what omniscient level of knowledge he 
possessed, which in the first place allowed him to 
warn her. A solemn and solipsistic grandiosity? 
Obviously, the background population does not 
associate subtle, discrete inappropriateness with 
schizophrenia, but they might nevertheless 
communicate in lay language, core characteristics in 
early referral situations, or schoolteachers may 
recognize discrete inappropriateness in 
phenomenologically informed questionnaires as a 
potential long-term perspective of this study. The 
aim here is first and foremost to explore the lay 
language that may unintentionally point to core 
aspects of social or contextual inappropriateness 
verbalized in familiar, “common” language, which 
may nevertheless designate a vulnerability trait. 
 
Background and method 
The empirical background of the present study is a 
study that examined a “blinded” Danish background 
population’s sensitivity to contextual (in)appropriate-
ness in first-episode schizophrenia patients’ 
narratives (9). Six narratives from first-episode 
patients and six narratives from healthy controls had 
been collected at Psychiatric Center Glostrup in 
Copenhagen between 2004 and 2007. These groups 
had been matched for age (range, 18 to 32) and 
education; however, only one male person responded 
when encouraged to participate in the control group. 
The patient group had received a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia following the ICD-10 (1994) and the 
duration of “first” episode was maximum two years. 
The control group had no reported history of 
psychiatric illness. Patient and control narratives had 
been elicited from the wordless picture story Frog, 
Where Are You? (10); henceforth, F-WAY? This story 
is used in research projects around the world as 
language-elicitation material (11-12), including 
projects on first-episode schizophrenia patients in 
Norway (13) and Denmark (14). 
Out of these 12 narratives, five patient narratives 
and five control narratives were selected for 
evaluation by the background population in order to 
reduce the amount of reading for the evaluators and 
not to exceed the time limit of 1.5 hours, which 
corresponded to one lesson in high school. 
The background population or “lay” evaluation 
group (n=198; mean age, 18.5) was recruited among 
students from 10 high school classes from Næstved 
Gymnasium, Midtsjællands Gymnasium (Haslev), 
and Roskilde Katedralskole in Denmark. 
Participation was volitional. The choice of high 
school students as lay evaluators was based on the 
basic assumption that a fair evaluation of 
(in)appropriateness ought to derive from evaluators 
at approximately the same age and at the same 
educational level as the first-episode schizophrenia 
patients and controls who told the narratives [a more 
advanced evaluation of these narratives, based on 
pragmatically oriented functional linguistics, can be 
found elsewhere (15)]. 
The experimental evaluation procedure in the high 
schools had four stages (the third stage was central). 
First, the evaluators/the students were introduced 
to the picture story F-WAY? via a slideshow. 
Second, the evaluators were asked to tell a story 
from the pictures in the slideshow (silently in their 
“own head”). These two initializing steps in the 
evaluation procedure were undertaken to mime, as 
far as possible, the conditions under which patient 
and control narratives had once been collected. In 
general, and once again, the aim was to stimulate only 
fair evaluations. In particular, the evaluators were 
asked to tell a story themselves, because negative 
evaluations might have come too easy, if they had no 
firsthand experience with the narrative task (it might 
be easy to criticize what you have not tried yourself). 
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Third, the evaluators were given 10 narratives 
(approximately 7000 words) selected from the 12 
narratives collected at Psychiatric Center Glostrup 
between 2004 and 2007 (see above). Thus, these 
narratives were told by first-episode schizophrenia 
patients (five narratives) and healthy controls (five 
narratives), and the evaluators were asked to 
intuitively evaluate which narratives they found 
“mostly appropriate and natural” and which they 
considered “sometimes inappropriate and in friction 
with” the narrative context and as a response to the 
storytelling task. This last pleonasm (“as a response” 
and “in the narrative context”) was used intentionally 
to emphasize the contextual focus of the study; what 
is contextually appropriate and inappropriate? 
Subsequently, the polysemous nature of language 
was disambiguated; the adjectival meaning of 
“appropriateness” (Danish “passende”) should not be 
associated with the meaning of combined verb and 
fixed proposition (Danish “passe til”) in the sense 
that the words should match the pictures, nor was 
“inappropriateness” a question of morality (the 
Danish “passende” has a strong moral meaning 
which might be provoked in an elicitation material-
specific manner as a baby frog is taken away from its 
parents in F-WAY?). Finally, “intuitive” evaluation 
was explained as which narratives the student “felt 
for” and which narratives were “different from” their 
own narratives. The evaluation instruction was 
informed a priori by conceptual insights from 
phenomenologically oriented psychiatry; a method 
which is generally akin to a “front-loaded” research 
design, which molds the experiment in advance by 
e.g. phenomenological concepts or clarifications (16). 
More precisely, phenomenologically “informed” 
alludes to the emphasis in the evaluation instruction 
on (1) contextual inappropriateness, (2) a certain reliance 
on intuition as diagnostically informative, and (3) 
feelings of “Anderssein” or a certain difference, 
potentially perceptible to others as a reduced ability 
to empathize with, in the present evaluation, the 
character and events in the patients’ narratives. This 
method is not in itself “phenomenological”; 
phenomenological method use patients’ first-person 
perspective often with directly cited patients’ 
utterances concerning symptoms and illness 
experiences, but the present study is based upon 
“third”-person evaluation of narratives. Ideally, the 
present study analyzes lay language, which may be 
communicated from the patient’s first-person 
perspective and understood by others form the third 
person perspective. Thus, the discussion primarily 
focuses on central descriptions of the core Gestalt of 
schizophrenia as well as those evaluations of 
inappropriateness that may actually coincide with 
these – for example, when empirical-phenomeno-
logical studies report the patients’ subjectively felt 
“insecurity”, a “growing uncertainty”, or 
“strangeness” and the evaluators in the present study 
explain inappropriateness as based upon the patients 
“insecurity”, “strangeness”, or “the nonsense” in 
their narratives. The evaluators were “blinded” to the 
control and patient status – that is, which narrative 
was from patients and which was from controls. A 
small cell diagram followed each narrative, and the 
evaluators were asked to make a binary choice or, 
more precisely, to “put only one cross” (“natural” or 
“in friction?”). The patients’ narratives were A, C, F, 
I, and J, and the controls’ narratives were B, D, E, G, 
and H (the narratives were represented to the 
evaluators alphabetically): 
 
 
 
Patient; ICD-10 diagnosis 
A Male; F20.6 Simple Schizophrenia 
C Female; F20.0 Paranoid Schizophrenia 
F Male; F20.0 Paranoid Schizophrenia 
I Male; F20.0 Paranoid Schizophrenia 
J Male; F20.3 Mixed Schizophrenia 
 
Control 
B Female 
D Female 
E Female  
G Male 
H Female 
 
 
Fourth, the evaluation group was given an 
“explanation” sheet and was asked to explain why or 
how each narrative was “mostly appropriate” or 
“sometimes in friction” with the context, or to 
illustrate this with directly cited examples from the 
narratives. 
One hundred and fifty-seven students completed 
all parts of this procedure. The general result was that 
the patient narratives were consequently evaluated as 
more inappropriate than appropriate, whereas the 
controls’ narratives were consequently evaluated as 
more appropriate than inappropriate (9). Generally, 
67% intuitively evaluated patient narratives as 
inappropriate and control narratives as appropriate 
(significant with 0.007). A problem, however, was 
that a broad range indicated that the sensitivity 
toward which narratives were from patients or 
controls were relatively individual. 
The present study systematizes the salient lay 
experts’ explanations on why or how the patient 
narratives were inappropriate; that is, “experts” are 
defined as students who, guided by the 
phenomenologically informed evaluation instruction, 
in 80% to 100% of all evaluations evaluated patient 
narratives as inappropriate and control narratives as 
appropriate (n=63). The rationale for this design is 
that if almost all patient narratives are considered 
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inappropriate and almost all control narratives are 
considered appropriate, some pattern recognition 
potentially guided this evaluation. “Salient” 
explanations are explanations repeated by, usually, 
several lay experts; that is, when the evaluators seem 
to agree upon why the patients’ narratives are 
inappropriate as far as they literally use the same 
explanative term.  
 
Results  
Explanations and explanative trends 
Table 1 shows the lay experts’ explanations cited 
directly of why or how the patients narratives were 
contextually inappropriate. The numbers in 
parentheses show how many evaluators used a 
particular explanation – for example, 31 evaluators 
concurrently evaluated the patient narratives as 
inappropriate, because they were “short”. 
The explanations can be grouped into three 
subgroups: affective explanations concerning how the 
patient felt or how the evaluators felt reading the 
narrative; formal explanations concerning pauses, 
fluency, and brevity; and explanations concerning 
understanding, interpretation, and meaning as well as 
aesthetics, provisorily placed side by side, because 
meaning may be regarded as, basically, aesthetic. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Lay experts’ explanative trends; formal, affective and meaning aspects 
FORMAL ASPECTS 
Length Fluency Unfilled pauses Filled pauses 
“short” (n=31) 
“not detailed” (n=13) 
“enumeration” (n=5) 
“only one sentence at a time” (n=1) 
“keyword form” (n=1) 
“minimalistic” (n=1) 
“not fluent” (n=15) 
“not going as a story ought to” (n=1) 
 
“many/ 
“long pauses” (n=22) 
“notches” (n= 4)  
“stops” (n=4) 
“dots” (n=1) 
“uhm” (n=18) 
AFFECTIVE ASPECTS 
The patient is The reading experience is for the evaluators 
“uncertain” (n=22)  
“confused” (n=9) 
“in doubt” (n=3) 
“nervous” (n=3) 
“unserious” (n=2) 
“hesitating” (n=1) 
“afraid of what to say” (n=1) 
“feels uncomfortable in the situation” (n=1) 
“in difficulties” (n=1) 
“indifferent” (n=1) 
“unfocused” (n=1) 
“unconcentrated” (n=1) 
“confusing” (n=10) 
“annoying” (n=9) 
“disturbing” (n=6) 
“boring” (n=5) 
“tiresome” (n=2) “distracting” (n=1) 
“uncertain narrator, so I was uncertain of the events” (n=1) 
“indifference affects the reader” (n=1) 
ASPECTS RELATED TO AESTETICS AND MEANING 
Aestetics Meaning/Understanding/Interpretation 
“only descriptions of pictures” (n=11) 
“not so much story” (n=6) 
“no fantasy” (n=4) 
“superficial” (n=3) 
“not making things up” (n=1) 
“too simple?” (n=1) 
“no depth” (n=1) 
“does not catch me” (n=1) 
“mechanical” (n=1) 
“not empathic enough” (n=1) 
“strange” (n=5) 
“mystic” (n=1) 
“gives no meaning” (n=3) 
“does not understand” (“the experiment”) (n=2) 
“far from how I would tell” (n=1) 
“disturbing and imprecise in relation to my own interpretation” (n=1) 
“not clear, what he wants to say” (n=1)  
“I do not interpret in the same way” (n=1)  
“incorrect language, made me not understand the story” (n=1) 
“uncertain of what happens” (n=1) 
“difficult to follow the story” (n=1) 
“difficulty to find an understanding and a meaning” (n=1) 
“lack of understanding in relation to my own interpretation” (n=1) 
“difficulty in finding main story line” (n=1) 
“does not know how the story should be interpreted” (n=1) 
“wrong events” (n=1) 
“nonsense” (n=1) 
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Under formal explanations, lack of fluency and 
pauses are probably two sides of the same coin; 
“pauses” as the positive or neutral explanation and 
“lack of fluency” as the negative explanation for the 
same phenomenon of silence. Both are common in 
spoken language, but violate written language norms 
(all narratives were transcribed verbatim and printed 
as such to the evaluators). Consequently, spoken-
ness characteristics may “naturally” have elicited 
contextual inappropriateness evaluations1. On the 
other hand, spoken-ness characteristics are 
particularly interpretation rich as MaClay and 
Osgood (1959) suggest in one of the first influential 
works on pauses and hesitation signals (such as 
“uhm”): “naturally-appearing pauses and other 
hesitation phenomena influence the listener’s 
connotative judgments of the speaker, e.g. of the 
speaker’s “sincerity”” (17, p. 43). I will leave this 
issue, as the decisive factor is unclear (on “brevity” 
in 4.1). 
Under affective explanations, the evaluators seem 
to mark a distance from the patients interpreted as 
“uncertain” and themselves experience the reading as 
“annoying”, “confusing” and “disturbing”, but this 
may be due to the evaluators' knowledge of their role 
as evaluators.2 The importance of affect in 
schizophrenia is discussed below (4.2.). 
Sensitivity to formal and affective explanations 
have previously been found in a qualitative study of 
one class (9); in the present study the lay experts add 
to this inappropriateness evaluation sense or meaning. 
But what is meant by meaning and related 
explanations? 
 
Explanations of explanations; additional information from 
the evaluators 
Occasionally, the explanations are supported by 
more than one explanation per narrative, presumably 
related enumerations or even sentence formed 
explanations with additional information elaborating 
further on this explanation, hereby, in various ways, 
constituting “explanations of explanations”. 
If we take a closer look at the explanation sheets 
and ask what the lay experts meant by referring to no 
“meaning”, lack of “understanding”, different 
“interpretation” and “strange” or “mystic” patient 
narratives, each time these explanations occurred, 
this additional information appears rather 
ambiguous. The following analysis, reports all 
additional information about, what the evaluators 
meant by referring to these explanations of 
                                                     
1The explanations “notches”, “stops”, and “dots” seem to 
comment upon some perceived strangeness of such phenomena 
in the narratives, whereas the lay evaluators use of the term 
“pauses” probably recognize the conventional notation in the 
narratives (verbatim “…” and “uhm”).  
explanations. This method is transparent in the sense 
that all added explanations of explanations are 
presented below. 
Lack of “meaning” is related to “brevity” as 
Narrative I is “too short, gives no meaning if you 
have not seen the pictures” and Narrative J is “short, 
gives no meaning” (evaluator 51). In addition, 
meaning is related to fictive elements as it “gives no 
meaning to me, that the animals talk” in Narrative A 
(evaluator 57). This explanation refers to the fictive 
or imaginary use of direct speech, which strictly 
speaking is not used in the wordless elicitation 
material. Finally, lack of orientation is found 
disturbing in Narrative I; “no proper meaning, 
because the boy suddenly gets a baby frog home with 
him, while the narrator had not introduced it 
beforehand” (evaluator 146).3 
Lack of “understanding” is primarily related to 
“pauses”. Evaluator 70 had “difficulty in finding an 
understanding maybe because of the pauses and 
“ehh”” in narrative A, and in the same manner 
narrative J was “difficult to read and understand 
because of “ehh, okay”. Similarly, evaluator 133 
comments on Narrative F by “many notches…does 
not understand the story”. Additionally, evaluator 
123 explains that “incorrect language made me not 
understand the story”, in Narrative A evaluator 149 
distinguishes his own understanding from the 
patient’s understanding in narrative J “lack of 
understanding in relation to my own story”, and 
evaluator 83 explains that the narrator F “does not 
understand the experiment” (an explanation 
probably provoked by many initial questions about 
how to narrate, see below). 
Narrative I, J and F (and occasionally Narrative A) 
are continually mentioned as lacking in meaning or 
understanding, which are related to formal aspects of 
“brevity” and “pauses”, respectively. 
“Interpretation” is often related to the lay expert’s 
own interpretation. Evaluator 68 states that the 
patient “does not know how the story should be 
interpreted” (Narrative F), implying that evaluator 68 
does know this, evaluator 103 states that “I don’t 
interpret the same way” (Narrative C), and evaluator 
149 states that Narrative F is “very disturbing and 
imprecise in relation to my own interpretation” just 
as Narrative J is “lacking and incomprehensible in 
relation to my own interpretation”. 
Finally, six evaluators find narrative I, J, C and F 
“strange” or “mystic”. Three evaluators explain that 
Narrative F “starts strangely” (evaluator 30), has a 
2 Thus, this study says nothing about self-other biases, e.g. 
evaluation of the oneself more positively than evaluations of a 
generalized other. 
3 Evaluator 70 do not give additional explanation (“difficult to 
find an understanding and meaning” in Narrative F). 
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“mystic start” (evaluator 99), or that the narrator 
initially “destroys everything, is uncertain, disruptive 
and much like ‘then this happened and then this happened’” 
(evaluator 19). In addition, some evaluators explain 
that narrative I is “strange to read after the long 
stories” (evaluator 15), that Narrative J is “short, 
imprecise, strange” (evaluator 19), that Narrative C 
has “many strange pauses and details and a strange 
ending” (evaluator 26) and that Narrative F has “short 
paragraphs, which do not give meaning in relation to 
the events, strange details, which do not fit the story 
telling style” (evaluator 26). Finally, Narrative C “ends 
strangely, as if the frog does not come home” 
(evaluator 150, similar to evaluator 26 mentioned 
above).  
To summarize, Narratives F, I, J and C were in 
particular found “strange” and “mystic”, and these 
four narratives were most frequently evaluated as 
inappropriate by the larger group of 157 high school 
students (respectively; 92%, 72%, 72% and 59%, 9).  
Finally, if we take a closer look at when these 
narratives are inappropriate, it is especially at the 
beginning - that is, the story elicited from the first 
picture (Picture 1) and at the end  -  that is, the story 
elicited from the final picture (Picture 24), as 
indicated in italics in the previous paragraph. 
Table 2 presents the full narration elicited from 
Picture 1 in Narratives I and J as well as the full 
narration elicited from Picture 24 in Narrative C, 
however, due to the lack of space only the initial 
narration elicited from Picture 1 in Narrative F is 
presented below (the patient’s questions continued). 
Comments in parentheses are the researchers 
answers to the patients questions (in Narratives I and 
J). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Narration to Picture 1 and 24 
Narrative F 
(Picture 1) 
Narrative I 
(Picture 1) 
Narrative J 
(Picture 1) 
Narrative C 
(Picture 24) 
I just have to figure out how to get 
started (You just take your time, 
and you can use these arrows 
when you need to). Yes. Does one 
(Danish: man) have to give the 
story a title? (You don’t need to … 
you don’t need to, you can if you 
want, but just (Danish altså) … just 
try to make a story based on the 
pictures) 
Are you (Danish: man) allowed to 
give the boy a name?…………. 
(…THE QUESTIONS CONTINUE…) 
I will give it a try…okay…once 
upon a time, there was a boy. He 
had caught a frog…but when he 
went to bed, then, then the frog 
saw his chance to run away. 
Should I describe the pictures or 
tell a story? (It is your choice). 
Okay. Uhm…they, it is a boy and a 
dog, who has found a 
frog…uhm…that they are looking 
at… 
and then…and then they take the 
frog home again…even if it had a 
family…and a lot of siblings and a 
mother and farther. And I think, 
that was where it preferred to be. 
So it did not end quite happily. 
That was it, I think” 
 
 
 
These beginnings and this end share a particular 
characteristic. They are meta commentaries at an 
experimental level (italics in Table 2) as opposed to 
just “doing it” – that is, telling the story a level 
“inside” the narrative world. Narratives F and J 
apparently question the rules of the narrative game 
and in Narrative C the story as depicted on the 
pictures takes its course independently of the 
narrator, who disagrees about this unhappy ending. 
Only if the pictures are somehow distant from the 
narrator, does the narrator have reasons to excuse 
her narrative potentially with “so it did not end quite 
happily”. In a similar vein, a patient’s indignant 
reactions toward the lack of ownership of her or his 
thoughts seem only relevant if a phenomenological 
distance is actually present – for example, “my 
thoughts have no respect for me” (18, p. 1301). This 
distance is described as coexisting and only 
occasionally to collide. 
But what about Narrative C? The conjunction 
“selvom” (even if) in Danish introduces a reason that 
is left out or cancelled (19, p. 1548), as if the narrator 
cancels her own narrative. The narrator apparently 
reports events according to what is presented on the 
pictures (the boy leaves with a frog), “even” if it has 
a family, and the depressive magnitude of this is 
illustrated with the addition “and a lot of siblings and 
a mother and a father”. Finally, the patient explicitly 
uses the first person pronoun to announce her 
negative reaction to the story “and I think, it was 
there (with the family) it would preferably be. So it 
didn’t end very happily”; now, also, contrary to the 
traditional happy ending. Negations notoriously 
presuppose a counter-view, thus, saying “I’m not 
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coming tomorrow” presuppose that somebody 
thinks or might think the opposite or that something 
else was expected (20). In Narrative C, the narrator’s 
story collides with the narrative expectations of the 
standard happy ending. In sum, the pictures seem to 
take their independent course regardless of both the 
narrator and the narrative tradition. 
These beginnings and this end may be considered 
“strange” by the lay experts, because the default 
position of the authorial authority is radically 
destroyed by questions in Narratives F and J, and 
because the narrator’s authorial lead in Narrative C 
collides with both the narrative tradition and the 
pictured events. Or generally because the patients 
have a certain distance toward their own narratives 
or merely describe events by “enumeration” – e.g., 
“then this happened and then this happened”. 
A final remark; formal thought disorders, as 
measured by, for example, the Thought Disorder 
Index, are traditionally mediated by and measured as 
language deviations. The evaluators in the present 
study may obviously have taken into account, e.g., 
what they consider as inappropriate distance toward 
the (narrative) task, needless excessive qualification 
etc. 
 
Discussion of empirical evaluations in 
phenomenological studies 
Given the content, the explanations of 
inappropriateness in Table 1 are likely to be 
intimately related; one evaluator’s explanation that 
“uhm” is inappropriate, may by another evaluator be 
explained as inappropriate with at slightly different 
explanative focus, because the narrative is 
“disturbing” for him to read (thus, formal and 
affective aspects collide). Likewise, one evaluator’s 
explanation that a narrative is “only description of 
pictures”, may by another evaluator be explained as 
inappropriate, because it is “boring” to read (thus, 
aesthetic and affective aspects collide), or “short” 
narratives as explained by one evaluator, may be 
“superficial” or even “strange” to another evaluator 
(formal and aesthetic aspects collide potentially with 
aspects of meaning). The imaginative ease with 
which the explanations may be related and 
occasionally are related by the lay experts suggests 
that this discussion is primarily relevant at a more 
abstract-conceptual level in the light of 
phenomenological conceptualizations and empirical 
findings. 
Because everything is not inappropriate, given that 
many explanations may be categorized, e.g. as 
“affects”, the elusive nature of the evaluators’ 
                                                     
4The definition of “empathy” in many dictionaries is 
“understanding” or sharing of feelings”. From a diachronic 
explanations do not necessarily relate to the 
polysemy of language or the elusive nature of 
pragmatic taste trials. This elusiveness may simply 
reflect the elusive nature, as it is described, of the 
Gestalt of schizophrenia (21). For example, the 
Gestalt is defined as a pervasive “global” experience 
transcending “all domains of mental life” and 
consequently also inner and outer aspects (4, p. 
1128). The psychiatrist “may not only register the 
external signs, but also sense an inner change 
(symptoms)” (21, p. 262). In the present study, the 
lay experts’ formal explanations register concrete 
“signs” of “brevity”, “fluency” and “pauses”, but 
also sense or interpret the patients’ inner feelings as 
being “uncertain”, “nervous”, “confused”, or 
“indifferent”.  
The intriguing question “do the lay experts 
perceive the same core Gestalt of schizophrenia as 
the skilled psychiatrist” is, however, circular, since 
the lay experts were phenomenologically informed. 
Henceforth, the subsequent discussion primarily 
focuses on the central descriptions of the core 
Gestalt of schizophrenia as well as those evaluations 
that may actually correspond to these; in particular, 
“strangeness” as an extreme description and, for 
example, “uncertainty” as a more subtle, but 
persistent description. 
 
Incomprehensibility, strangeness, lack of meaning, nonsense 
In classic texts, something “Ünverständliches” may 
be experienced by both patient and psychiatrist (22, 
p. 30) or be “incompréhensible” for the psychiatrist, 
but swiftly transformed into guiding life principles 
for the patient – that is, indicating some “meaning” 
dictating nothing less than life (23, p. 149) or 
“beyond our comprehension”, but nevertheless 
potentially indicative of the patient’s “failed attempts 
toward communication” (24, p. 339).  
Despite differences, some agreement prevails. 
Even if the “incomprehensible” by definition is not 
understandable, it may still be shared with the listener 
as a “shared alienation, a feeling evoked by accurate 
intuitions of what the patient is actually going 
through” (25, p. 241). Patients may not communicate 
any precise meaning – given the “unexpected swerves 
and cryptic references” and “puzzlements that can 
erode the very framework of human understanding” 
(ibid., p. 175) – but on the other hand the patient may 
prompt an “accurate intuition” of what he or she is 
“actually” going through4. Or in the older approach of 
Rumke, the psychiatrist should examine his or her 
feelings, “despair”, or “manoeuvres” (sic!) to “find 
the patient” (24, pp. 337, 336). Basically, the doctor 
perspective of schizophrenia, potentially suggestive of a certain 
taxonomy of understanding and (a later possibility of only) sharing. 
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“cannot find the patient” (and in this approach 
consequently neither “share” with him), because of a 
“diminution of the rapprochement-drive” or reduced 
directness toward other people grounded in “formal 
chances” in the patient’s “dynamics”, which induce 
“unease” in the doctor, because of the 
incomprehensibility, but nevertheless a “specific 
experience” of diagnostic significance (ibid., p. 341). 
This specific experience was termed “precox feeling” 
and described as “the final and most important 
guideline” in the diagnosis of schizophrenia (ibid., p. 
336).  
In sum, the strange or incomprehensible is 
intimately correlated with accuracy of diagnostic 
specificity.  
In the present study, the lay experts actually 
describe the patient narratives as “strange” and 
“mystic” (Table 1), and exemplified in the narratives, 
this strangeness refers to various questions about the 
narrative task or critical comments on their own 
narrative manifesting a certain distance (Table 2). 
Also, explanations such as “only description of 
pictures”, “mechanical”, “superficial”, “not emphatic 
enough”, and “enumeration” (Table 1), for example, 
“then this happened and then this happened”, seem 
to refer to a somehow distant narrator. Such distance 
may provoke the traditional habit of mediating the 
narrative with meaning as far as it is told by 
somebody, unlike world events which just 
“happen”5.  
Consequently, an inappropriate distance manifests, 
according to the lay experts, both in meta 
commentaries on an experimental level as well as on 
the story level “inside” the narrative world, i.e., as a 
pervasive inappropriateness, which so to speak, does 
not care about level. Pervasiveness defines the subtle 
Gestalt of schizophrenia (4). Inspired by 
Minkowski’s description of loss of vital contact with 
reality, the lay experts may to some extent actually 
share the patients’ potential inability to “resonate” 
with their own narrative and henceforth the lay 
experts’ ability to “empathize” and be “affected” by 
the narratives, may also be weakened (4, p. 1123). Or 
as some lay experts explain, the narratives are 
“boring”, “tiresome”, “indifference” affects the 
reader and another evaluator is simply “not caught” 
(Table 1). Nearly all explanations concerning 
aesthetics negate its presence with “only”, “not”, and 
“no” (Table 1) suggesting that something else was 
expected – e.g., fantasy, meaning, depth, and 
empathy. 
Berze suggested that the basic disturbance in 
schizophrenia was a “primary insufficiency” of 
                                                     
5Or unlike experimenting-behavioristic narratives – with feigned 
objectivity. 
various degrees; in mild forms patients’ reactions 
appear “strained” and purposeful activity, attention, 
direction, comprehension, and capacity to think 
clearly was described as diminished or weakened (26, 
p. 52)6. 
In general, the lay experts in the present study seem 
not to have their expectations met, given that 
negations penetrate nearly all explanations, in 
particular, formal aspects (e.g. “not fluent”, “not going 
as a story ought to”) and aspects related to meaning 
and aesthetics (e.g., “gives no meaning”, “does not 
understand”, “not clear what he wants to say”, “I do 
not interpret the same way”, “lack of understanding”, 
“does not know how the story should be interpreted” 
(Table 1). Whether pauses are suggestive of 
“strained” efforts of purposeful, goal-directed 
storytelling, is not quite clear since pauses as a spoken 
language characteristic may “naturally” elicit 
inappropriateness evaluations of written texts. 
Explanations like “not going as a story ought to” 
seem, however, to signal expectation of a certain 
willful intentionality or creative power. And some 
formal explanations potentially thematize a basic lack 
of objectively observable reactivity or affectability 
stimulated by the elicitation material, “eliciting” only 
“minimalistic”, “short”, and “not detailed” 
narratives. Finally, conceptual clarity, luminosity, and 
“comprehension” are potentially thematized in 
inappropriateness explanations like “no meaning”, 
“difficult to follow”, “not clear”.  
The lay experts’ evaluations appear somehow in 
line with Berze’s third-person descriptions; the 
narratives appear as not sufficient, being too short (a 
formal aspect) and too emptied of meaning (an 
aspect related to sense), or, in sum, “too short, gives 
no meaning” and “short, gives no meaning”. As seen 
here, “brevity” is not necessarily associated with 
something (affective aspects like “uncertainty”), but 
also with nothing or no meaning.  
Lack of meaning or understanding is at the center 
of Sass’ introduction to the listener’s “precox 
feeling” (25, pp. 174–175). In conclusion, “brevity” 
may give rise to “no meaning”, which may 
obligatorily be incomprehensible or even “strange”, 
“mystic”, or “bizarre”. 
 
Affect and meaning 
Schizophrenia is often associated with disturbed 
reality testing and thinking, conceptualizations that 
may neglect the fact that affective abnormalities may 
be among the most central features, in particular 
because they are intimately related with alternations 
of personhood, self-experiences, and changes of the 
6On complications; see below. 
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self (27, p. 1). Central to the initial 
“Grundstimmung” in schizophrenia is an inner 
insecurity, doubt, and skeptical disunity 
(“Zerrisseheit”) that may later “convert” to its 
opposite (22, pp. 30, 32, 33). According to Störring, 
“perplexity” (“Ratlosigkeit”) is to some extent 
pathognomonic for schizophrenia and based on “the 
experience of being unable to maintain a consistent 
grasp of reality” (28, p. 81). Recently, the loss of the 
“implicit non-conceptual grip of the ‘rules of the 
game’” as a “pre-understanding of the context and 
background” are associated with “ambivalence and 
perplexity (confusion about meaning)” (4, p. 1123). 
Loss of meaning and perplexity are considered core 
features and particularly crucial for early 
identification and psychotherapy (29). 
Several empirical studies suggest that 
“uncertainty”, “insecurity”, and other descriptors of 
affect as well as “strangeness” and descriptors related 
to meaning are continually found in initial stages of 
schizophrenia and in first-episode patients. 
Møller and Husby (30) studied the initial prodrome 
retrospectively in 19 first-episode schizophrenia 
patients and found continuous descriptions of 
“strangeness”, frequently, of the usually most 
familiar (“stranger to myself”) as well as doubts about 
being “good enough”, a “growing uncertainty”, 
“uncertain gender identity”, experiences of being 
socially more “insecure”, “afraid to talk”, and an 
impossibility to “relax” (ibid., pp. 227–228). 
Henriksen et al. (29) reported, in a qualitative 
single-case study of one introspective patient with 
schizophrenia, that pre-psychotic feelings of being 
“uncertain and anxious in any activity or project” 
were present around first episode and that the 
patieent “doubted his identity” accompanied by 
feelings of “strangeness” of the usually most familiar 
expressed in questions like “Who am I?”, “Who are 
my parents?” (p. 362). The patient ascribes a primary 
role to feelings, which preceded the cognitive 
delusional elaboration: “first of all, there was anxiety. 
The story I build upon it (the delusion) was not so 
important” (ibid., p. 363).  
Conrad (31) examined 107 soldiers admitted to a 
military hospital during World War II with a first 
episode of schizophrenia and thematized with “das 
Trema” an increased “bodenaffektivität”, usually of 
anxiety and “insecurity”, but in delusion formation a 
sense of “uncertainty” was related to a sense of 
absolute “certainty” and to having no doubt that 
something was happening – that is, an “insecurity”, 
frequently about trivial, everyday events as well as 
absolute certainty that something was wrong. “Die 
Wahnstimmung” is, for example, described by a 
patient in the following manner: 
“als wäre zu Hause etwas nicht in Ordnung…Ich fühlte mich 
nicht sicher…auch die Kameraden haben mich ganz irre 
gemacht…ich weiss auch nicht, was das alles zu bedeuten 
hatte…(vielleicht war gar nichts?)…natürlich war etwas loss 
gegen mich, aber man sagte es mir nicht”  
[patient 89, Conrad (31), p. 43, my italics]. 
 
In delusion formation, an initial “uncertainty” is 
apparently replaced by a forced closure of meaning 
concretized and elaborated cognitively as a secondary 
psychotic work. As formulated elsewhere, the 
“pathic” or affective aspect is prominent as 
compared to the “gnostic” or cognitive aspect and 
“In the face of the disturbing uncertainty, the patient 
searches for solutions or answers” to their problems 
or questions (32, p. 79). 
Petersen (14) found epistemic expressions as well 
as questions, indicating uncertainty or need for 
certainty or precision in the potential initial 
prodrome, first-episode schizophrenia, and younger 
patients with several admissions manifested by 
adverbs (e.g., “maybe”, “presumably”, “apparently”), 
epistemic use of modal verb (e.g., “can be”, “it might 
be the case”), negated reflection or consciousness 
verbs (e.g., “I don’t know”, “I think”, “I guess”, “I 
assume”), and questions like “Is it good enough?”, 
“What happens here?”, “Are you allowed to give the 
boy a name?”, “Do you have to give the story a 
title?”, “Should I tell you what I see or what I 
experience?”. If patients were asked, sincerely, 
accurately, and as precisely as possible to relate what 
they saw in a wordless picture story, these epistemic 
expressions would be highly appropriate. The 
patients, however, were asked to “tell a story” from 
the wordless picture story and in this context these 
“facts in fiction” seem less appropriate, as 
appropriateness obviously changes according to 
context. 
Parnas and Sass (33, p. 438) reported an 
“incertitude” (i.e., polyvalence) in first episode 
patients with schizophrenia closely bound up with 
perplexity and a “strange” feeling of not being “really 
present” associated with a “mechanical” perceptual 
experience at a phenomenological “observing” 
distance. This distance is potentially responsible for 
less serious memory problems given a lack of 
involvement. 
In the present study, the patients’ questions about 
the narrative game invites an answer even if other 
narratives already exist as part of our culture – that 
is, they could implicitly have instructed about a 
narrative norm or tradition. Questions are usually 
paradigmatic examples of doubt and uncertainty; you 
may ask if something is not known (34), but also if 
you are in doubt and already know the answer. In the 
last situation, questions may avoid taking the 
dominant role and in contrast induce the listener to 
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act – for example, as in help-seeking questions (35, p. 
110). In the present study, Narrator F asked several 
information seeking questions and potentially also 
avoided to speak for himself by questioning the 
researcher instead (the narrative task implying a 
monologue was replaced by a dialogue in Narrative 
F, see Table 2). In addition, epistemic expressions 
manifesting (both) uncertainty and certainty appear 
throughout the directly cited patient utterances in 
Conrad’s contribution on first episode schizophrenia 
(exemplified above with “weiss…nicht”, “be-
deuten”…“natürlich”)7. 
Whereas the phenomenological studies are based 
on patients’ subjective rapports, the explanations in 
Table 1 are first and foremost evaluations of patients 
by others. And we may add, subjective life or not! 
The present study is, in other words, well aware that 
discrepancy may exist between objective signs 
observable from third-person perspective and 
subjective complaints reported by the patients in 
first-person accounts. Already in 1929, Berze (22) 
described patients, who from an objective observers 
point of view seemed “indifferent”, and on the other 
hand were “jovially” in “resonance” with 
surroundings as well as “moved” by intellectual 
considerations. Thus, patient narratives evaluated as 
inappropriate by the lay experts because the patient 
is apparently “unconcentrated”, “unfocused”, and 
“indifferent”, to the contrary, may imply a significant 
amount of concentration toward another context 
than that of the narrative, namely the psychotic. For 
example, the narratives were occasionally told in 
staccato with pauses of “total” silence, which 
additionally was so abrupt that taken together these 
patients seemed both highly attentive toward inner 
experience (total silence seemed to correspond to 
total attention) as well as maybe simply being 
interrupted by these experiences and therefore 
narrating in an abrupt manner. In a psychotic context 
in particular, silence may “communicate” in the 
company of a listener or reader who fills the gap of 
pauses with interpretations, including various 
projected content8. 
In this context, the naïve idea that the word 
denotes some reality “out there” or “in” the patient, 
seem especially important and we probably need to 
move well beyond any naïve referentialism of the 
word cited directly and consider the direct citations 
as evidence in language of a preferentialism, or as it 
were, a dis-preferentialism for the patient narratives, 
which is a preliminary description of how an early 
                                                     
7A discussion on the use of epistemic expressions is found in 
Petersen (15). 
8Projected contents, however, not open an endless variety of 
“only” individual projections; human’s capacity for imaginative 
and interpretive empathy tends to reduce the apparent 
vulnerability trait may be described from the third-
person perspective of common people.  
In sum, the more cognitively related explanations 
of inappropriateness (e.g., “unfocused”, “un-
concentrated”) should not necessarily be taken at 
face value, whereas the affective evaluations seem to 
correspond to several empirical studies on first-
episode schizophrenia. 
 
Clinical implications 
Precise psychiatric descriptions of the core Gestalt 
are said to clarify differential diagnostic uncertainties 
and help with the demarcation from other, non-
schizophrenia psychotic disorders (37). 
Phenomenological description, however, does not 
clarify diagnostics unless the conceptual subtext is 
already known. And this conceptual history is 
characterized as a disappearing heritage, as 
psychiatrists are not taught, and consequently are not 
aware of, the fundamental Gestalt (4, p. 1128). 
Words even do things to people when young 
psychiatrists are “mesmerized” by the adjective 
“operational” as if this pointed toward an 
unambiguous diagnostic entity (38, p. 69). 
Wording the world in lay language is probably less 
unpredictable. Lay language may have a superficial 
descriptive resemblance to symptoms more 
characteristic of other psychiatric conditions than 
schizophrenia (33, p. 438). But this resemblance may 
in itself be rather predictable. Thus, “uncertainty”, 
“strangeness”, and various related expressions were 
continually reported by patients in the 
phenomenological studies as well as interpreted by 
the evaluators in the present study.  
While “uncertainty” or “nervousness” may sound 
trivial, it can nevertheless be a significant part of the 
(person behind the) clinical picture in early stages, 
including various very human affects. Imagine a 
family entering the hospital and the mother opens 
the dialogue by describing her son as 
“unconcentrated”, “unfocused”, “indifferent”, and 
“unserious” in school, as being “afraid of what to 
say”, “in doubt”, “hesitating”, and “nervous” every 
day he leaves home, and in addition “uncertain” and 
“confused” about everything [(cognitive-)affective 
explanations from Table 1]. The first merely 
cognitively oriented batch of descriptions may be 
very unspecific and even associated with a typical 
teenager, the next may be taken to refer to anxiety 
disorders, and as the magnitude of complaints 
increases, severe psychopathology may be relevant. If 
uniqueness of projective contents (36, p. 69). Also in the present 
study, the various wording of the patients’ world is relatively 
uniform or grouped around basic formal or affective aspects or 
aspects related to meaning and interpretation. 
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this mother continues, she may admit that others find 
her son “strange” and “mystic”, because he at times 
speaks “nonsense”, and his utterances are somehow 
devoid of “meaning” or basic “understanding” 
(explanations related to sense, meaning, and 
interpretation given in Table 1). 
Møller and Husby reported “immense 
communicative barriers” (30, p. 221) in talking about 
the initial prodromal experiences, but lay language 
seems unavoidable in first referrals, and potentially 
even more so in countries where early intervention is 
recommended. Lay language may, however, hide 
cosmic proportions – for example, akin to an 
ontological insecurity suggestive of schizophrenia. 
Thus, early phases have been summarized as 
involving an “ontological crisis” for the patient, 
where “even the most fundamental components of 
self and world grow uncertain and unreliable” (39, p. 
22). In this light, the empirical findings in the present 
study may be more serious than they seem initially. 
When the evaluators evaluate the patients as 
“unconcentrated”, “unfocused”, and “indifferent”, 
the patient may on the contrary be highly 
concentrated and focused upon finding answers to 
their “uncertainty” in an effort to find meaning in the 
typically un-understandable psychotic. When a 
patient is described as “unserious”, he may precisely 
need to be taken very seriously. And when he is 
described as “uncertain”, “in doubt”, and 
“hesitating” he may be precisely so, corresponding to 
the evaluation by the lay experts as well as the 
subjective rapports in phenomenological studies. 
Not much said by the lay experts in the present 
study can be associated with the radical and 
traditional descriptions of what has historically 
defined delusions: extreme, tenacious conviction, 
absolute certainty, and incorrigibility. Sass critically 
continues this list: “unshakable”, “beyond 
argument”, expressed with “extraordinary 
conviction” and “an incomparable subjective 
certainty” (40, p. 36–7). In these traditional 
descriptions, the more complex picture has 
apparently been lost. Consider, in contrast, Müller-
Suur’s description of the distinctive features of the 
pre-psychotic stages described as characterized by 
“absolute uncertainty” and “absolute certainty”, in 
negative comparison: 
 
“According to Müller-Suur (1950) this is the distinctive 
feature of schizophrenia – i.e., non-schizophrenic delusional 
patients experience neither the sense of absolute uncertainty 
(Ungewissheit bewusstsein) in the pre-psychotic stages nor 
the sense of absolute certainty (Gewissheitsbewusstsein) in 
psychoses” (32, p. 79). 
 
Familiarity with the subtle phenotypic vulnerability 
trait may be of crucial importance to early 
identification and treatment (2, p. 135). Subtle 
psychopathology is by definition discrete and 
difficult to demarcate as diagnostic criterion, and in 
addition, the diagnostic criteria are stipulated at a 
very high severity level of hallucinations and 
delusions, capturing only a subset of patients with 
paranoid schizophrenia (4, p. 1128). 
The diagnostic-clinical consequence could 
therefore result in no identification, because the 
subtle psychopathology is neither recognized nor 
described in the diagnostic operational criteria. This 
double-blind spot could easily dismiss a patient who 
is neither specific nor dramatic enough. 
Furthermore, patients describing their experience in 
an “as-if’-mode” run the risk of being dismissed, 
because their descriptions are not radical enough, 
even if they are potentially at risk of impending 
schizophrenia, precisely for this reason – that is, 
because they basically articulate a reservation, doubts, 
and uncertainty saying “it is as if I am not myself”. 
Generally, the traditional descriptions imply a 
language modality that can cast a shadow over a 
potential risk of later development of schizophrenia 
if the reverse language modality is experienced in the 
clinic. The risk of overlooking “small” complaints is 
inherent or even invited in the light of the traditional 
descriptions, but phenomenological approaches 
seem to introduce the necessary complex and 
paradoxical picture. Sass even finds modal qualifiers, 
e.g., “so to speak” and “impression of” deleted in the 
English translation of Schreiber’s diary (40). And 
these expressions change the whole meaning of the 
sentence. 
Finally, knowing that even vague, trivial, or 
unspecific complaints may potentially hide more 
“serious” pathology can make empathy and 
understanding easier in early referral situations. In 
addition, initial complaints may, despite vagueness, 
cover sufferings of self-disorders, which is worse 
than sufferings from psychotic symptoms (21, p. 
254). Because vague complaints can thus be out of 
proportion with the level of sufferings, they could be 
hiding; the clinician who “discovers” this hidden 
contrariness can provide an enormous relief to the 
patients who are “finally” understood. 
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